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From Hollywood to Hong Kong -
Criminal Antitrust Enforcement is Coming
to a City Near You
Scott D. Hammond*
Come gather 'round people
Wherever you roam
And admit that the waters
Around you have grown
And accept it that soon
You'll be drenched to the bone
If your time to you
Is worth savin'
Then you better start swimmin'
Or you'll sink like a stone
For the times they are a-changin'**
I. Introduction
What are the risks to a multinational company if it engages in
international cartel activity? The answer to that question is changing
day by day because laws, policies, and attitudes towards cartel
enforcement are constantly changing around the world. Perhaps one
of the most telling examples of how the image of antitrust
enforcement has changed is its treatment in the media. News
coverage of antitrust crimes has become almost sensational. For
example, the fine art auction trial that started in the fall of 2001,
which centers on a price-fixing conspiracy involving the world's two
dominant auction houses, Christie's and Sotheby's, is being covered
by nearly every news publication from the Wall Street Journal to
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** Bob Dylan, The Times They Are A-Changin', on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-
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People magazine. The best-selling book The Informant - based on
the Department's covert investigation of a worldwide lysine cartel
involving the Archer Daniels Midland Company and others - was on
the New York Times bestseller list for months on end. Finally,
something you may have thought you would never see - even
Hollywood has jumped on the antitrust bandwagon with last
summer's release of the movie titled, simply, AntiTrust. Now, I grant
you that the movie was quite dreadful, it had nothing to do with
antitrust crimes, and it bombed at the box office. However, there is
still hope for an antitrust blockbuster. The movie rights for The
Informant were recently sold to Hollywood, and so there still could
be an Oscar featuring the antitrust laws in the near future.
Of course, it is not just Hollywood taking notice of the
antitrust laws for the first time. Consumer and business groups in the
United States and abroad are becoming increasingly vocal about the
need for strong antitrust enforcement. And, foreign law enforcement
authorities are now investigating and punishing cartel activity that for
years was overlooked and unpunished.
How did antitrust crimes suddenly become the rage? What
has caused the media, the business community, consumers, and our
sister law enforcement authorities to look differently at antitrust
crimes? Those are the questions I will focus on today - not just how
attitudes around the world have changed with regard to anti-cartel
enforcement, but a few thoughts on why they have changed.
First, in order to understand the conversion abroad, we need
to begin by recalling how criminal antitrust enforcement has changed
in the United States. So, I will start by offering some perspective by
comparing what the Antitrust Division's criminal docket looked like
10 years ago with what it looks like today. Because in order to fully
appreciate how much criminal antitrust enforcement has changed, we
need to recall what it was like before.
II. Criminal Antitrust Enforcement - 10 Years Ago
Versus Today
The Department has a rich and distinguished history of
aggressively investigating and prosecuting antitrust crimes. For the
most part, however, the prosecutions were aimed at domestic
conspiracies - not because we made a conscious policy not to
prosecute international cartels, but because we did not have evidence
of their existence. In the 1990's that began to change. Unfortunately,
there is not enough time here to discuss all of the factors behind the
Division's successful expansion into international cartel enforcement.
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I will simply state, without elaborating, that three of the biggest
factors were: (1) a reallocation of Division resources to make
international cartel enforcement one of the Division's highest
priorities; (2) the 1993 expansion of the Corporate Amnesty Program;
and (3) the development of cooperative relationships with foreign
antitrust authorities. To give you a flavor of the sea change in the
Division's international cartel enforcement efforts, consider these
statistics comparing the Division's docket ten years ago with today.
Ten years ago, the Antitrust Division only opened a few
investigations of suspected international cartel activity. Today, there
are over thirty sitting grand juries looking into such offenses. The
subjects and targets of these investigations over the past few years
have been located on five continents and in over twenty different
countries. Similarly, ten years ago, the Division filed only two cases
against foreign-based companies, both involving domestic
conspiracies, and not a single charge was brought against a foreign
individual defendant. So that it is clear that I have not picked a year
with a statistical anomaly, I should add that in the four previous
years, from 1987 through 1990, the Division did not bring a single
case against a foreign firm or a foreign national. By comparison, last
year nearly seventy percent of the companies charged by the Division
were foreign-based firms, and roughly thirty-three percent of the
individual defendants were foreign nationals. In fact, the Division has
now convicted foreign executives from Germany, Belgium, The
Netherlands, England, France, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Canada,
Mexico, Japan, and Korea for engaging in cartel activity. Moreover,
executives from Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden have
served prison sentences for violating U.S. antitrust laws.
The international cartels that have been prosecuted over the
last five years have, for the most part, dwarfed the domestic and
regional conspiracies that the Division had traditionally prosecuted.
Since fines for antitrust offenses under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines are based in large part on the amount of commerce
affected by the cartel, the fine levels for antitrust offenses have grown
to levels that were unimaginable ten years ago. For example, ten
years ago, roughly $20 million in total fines were imposed in
Division cases for the entire year. In fact, in the five years before and
after 1991, the Division obtained, on average, about $27 million in
' For a more detailed discussion of the factors which have contributed to the
Antitrust Division's success in fighting international cartels, see Gary R. Spratling,
Are the Recent Titanic Fines in Antitrust Cases Just the Tip of the Iceberg?, Speech
Before the ABA National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 6, 1998).
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criminal fines annually. In 2001, defendants were fined over $280
million, more than ten times that prior average. Moreover, in the last
five years, the Division has obtained over $2 billion in criminal fines
- many multiples higher than the sum total of all previous criminal
fines imposed for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act dating back
to its inception in 1890. Well over ninety percent of these fines were
in connection with the prosecution of multinational firms engaged in
international cartel activity.
Similarly, ten years ago, the largest corporate fine ever
imposed in an antitrust prosecution was $2 million. By comparison,
six antitrust defendants have now been fined $100 million or more,
including a $500 million fine imposed on F. Hoffmann-La Roche for
its leadership role in the international vitamin cartel. The $500
million fine has the distinction not only of being the highest fine ever
imposed in an antitrust case, it is also the largest single fine imposed
in a Department of Justice case for any crime, under any statute.
III. Inside The Lysine Cartel - The First Milestone
With that perspective, let's turn next to the issue of how and
why attitudes towards international cartel enforcement have changed
around the world. The first milestone, in my opinion, was the
Division's high-profile prosecution of Archer Daniels Midland
Company ("ADM"), its top executives, and their co-conspirators in
the worldwide lysine cartel. This case was investigated by the
Chicago Field Office and concluded with guilty pleas by all of the
world's major lysine producers and the conviction by a Chicago jury
of three former high-level ADM executives. This was a monumental
case for the Division's criminal enforcement efforts because it
grabbed the attention of so many groups that we were urgently trying
to reach - including the media, U.S. consumers, the business
community, and foreign governments. The investigation also
revitalized our relationship with the FBI. I will touch briefly on how
this investigation impacted each one of these groups.
First, the investigation and trial received unprecedented
exposure in the media for a number of reasons, including the identity
of the defendants, the use of a government informant inside ADM,
and the existence of video and audio tapes secretly recorded by the
FBI showing the conspirators in the act of fixing prices and carving
up the world market for lysine. Developments in the investigation
and trial were tracked closely by newspapers and weekly magazines.
Excerpts of the FBI tapes were played on television news shows.
And, as I mentioned earlier, the investigation spawned a best-selling
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book. This type of media exposure for an antitrust crime had never
happened before. So, for many Americans, this was their first
exposure to antitrust crimes. I know that I had friends and, I am
reluctant to admit, even family members call me about the case and
say, "Oh, now I finally get what you do for a living - go and nail the
crooks!" When the public viewed the tapes, they saw with their own
eyes an unmitigated, undeniable crime of fraud and deceit. One could
not have asked for a better introductory lesson for the U.S. public as
to why price fixing is a crime and why those that commit it are
criminals.
Secondly, the investigation completely revitalized our
partnership with the FBI. After the investigation, the FBI leadership
declared that antitrust crimes were one of the top priorities of its
white-collar crime program and then backed it up by dedicating
unprecedented resources to investigating antitrust crimes. Agents
followed their lead and became excited about working antitrust
investigations. Today, FBI agents are assigned to all of the Division's
ongoing international cartel investigations.
Thirdly, ADM's record-breaking $100 million fine and the
incarceration of its top executives reverberated through the board
rooms of multinational companies around the world - a prime group
of interest to the Division. The fine was more than six times greater
than the then-highest fine. Moreover, the executives, including the
Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors, were given at or near the
maximum three-year jail sentence allowable under the Sherman Act.
Of course, what also grabbed the business world's attention was the
way we collected the evidence against the lysine cartel - the co-
opting of one of the company's top executives as a cooperating
witness, the covert audio taping of telephone conversations and video
taping of meetings in bugged conference rooms, and the simultaneous
execution of search warrants by dozens of FBI agents at the offices of
the corporate subjects around the United States. By using informers,
tape recordings, and search warrants, the message to the business
community was clearly communicated - we will not pull any
punches. These are the bare knuckle tools that the Division will use
to detect and crack antitrust crimes.
Lastly, this case, and more specifically the tapes themselves,
had a monumental impact on a number of foreign governments. After
the case was tried, we sat down with foreign government officials and
played the tapes for them. In most cases, we were addressing more
than antitrust authorities, because, in many countries, the antitrust
officials did not need to be persuaded. They were already well aware
of the harm caused by cartel activity, and they were already pushing
2002]
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for reform in their laws or in their investigative powers. Thus, they
would arrange for us to meet with key government policy makers,
treasury officials who held the purse strings for additional funding, or
representatives of influential trade or business groups, so that we
could help win them over. And so we would play the tapes for them,
and they would see with their own eyes how their businesses and
their consumers were being victimized. We would talk about the
lysine and other international cartels prosecuted by the Division, and
they would see how these cartels had acted with impunity within their
borders. Simply put, the lysine tapes made foreign governments
question, if not rethink, how they investigated and treated cartel
offenses. And then came the knockout punch - the exposure of
"Vitamins, Inc," the worldwide vitamin cartel.
IV. Exposing Vitamins, Inc. - The Next Milestone
The detection and prosecution of the worldwide vitamin cartel
is the next major milestone, in terms of influencing the way many
people looked at cartel offenses, that I want to discuss. Once again, it
had a major impact on key audiences like the media, consumers, the
business community, and foreign governments - this time for many
of the same reasons, but also for a few new ones.
Like the lysine cartel, the vitamin cartel involved a
sophisticated secret global cartel, huge multinational defendants, and
massive fines. However, unlike lysine, this cartel involved a high-
visibility consumer product with tremendous media and consumer
appeal. Here was a cartel that impacted products that appeared in
nearly every household, and in every cupboard, of every consumer in
America. Here was a cartel that was so sophisticated that its members
were able to carve up the world's billion dollar vitamin market
among a few multi-national companies and fix prices on a country-
by-country basis around the world. Here was a cartel that operated for
nearly ten years with such precision and profit that it was tabbed
"Vitamins, Inc." by one of its members. It was the single largest
antitrust conspiracy the Division had ever uncovered, and the fines
and sentences imposed on the cartel members reflected just that.
And so, if there were any companies or executives who were
asleep when the lysine sentences were imposed, they would have to
be in a coma not to be awakened by this. Nearly a billion dollars in
fines were imposed against the cartel members, including a $500
million fine imposed against F. Hoffmann-La Roche and a $225
million fine imposed on BASF AG. In addition, eleven executives,
including six European executives, were sentenced to serve time in
572 [Vol. 14: 567
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U.S. prisons for their role in this conspiracy.
Of course, the high-profile nature of this conduct and the
massive fines that were imposed also grabbed the attention of the
foreign press, as well as foreign businesses and consumers. Many of
these groups demanded to know whether their governments would be
acting to protect their interests against cartel behavior. So, the
vitamin cases fueled the movement towards rethinking the adequacy
of competition laws and law enforcement powers that was already
beginning to take place in many governments abroad. These
governments began to ask themselves whether they had sufficient
penalties in place to deter cartel activity. Did their competition
authorities have the necessary investigative tools to detect cartel
activity when it occurs? Should cartel activity be treated as an
administrative or a criminal offense? Should individuals as well as
corporations be sanctioned for cartel offenses?
V. Cracking Down On Hardcore Cartels In The United
Kingdom
The United Kingdom is a prime example of a nation that has
grappled with these issues over the last few years and has instituted
dramatic changes in their cartel enforcement program. In March
2000, the British government implemented a new competition law
that prohibited cartels and other anti-competitive behavior and gave
its Office of Fair Trading new investigative powers and expanded
resources for detecting cartel activity. The new civil powers included
the creation of a leniency program that was modeled after the
Division's Corporate Leniency Policy. The Competition Act also
imposed a fining scheme that will lead to stiff penalties of up to thirty
percent of a company's U.K. annual turnover for violators. Little
more than a year later, the U.K. and U.S. governments agreed to
remove a "side letter" to the U.K.-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty ("MLAT"), which had excluded antitrust matters from the
scope of the cooperation provisions of the MLAT. The types of
assistance in antitrust matters that the U.K. can now provide to the
Division include the use of the U.K. courts to take testimony from
witnesses, obtain documents, and assist in the collection of criminal
fines. Finally, in November 2001, the U.K. government proposed
legislation that would create a new criminal offense for individuals
that engage in hardcore cartel activity. The proposed law would
provide for maximum jail sentences of up to five years for antitrust
offenders. The criminalization of cartel offenses in the U.K. may also
make it possible in the near future to extradite individuals involved in
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cartels from the U.K. to face antitrust charges in the United States.
Here is an excerpt about the proposed legislation from a letter
that appeared in a recent edition of the Financial Times. The letter
speaks volumes as to how dramatically the debate has changed in the
U.K., not just because of its content, but because of the identity of its
author. The letter begins:
If there is a guiding principle that dictates the way we do
business in the United Kingdom it is that it should be
conducted fairly. Anti-competitive practices create weak
markets, protect the inefficient, deprive us of choice, stifle
innovation and support bad practice. They defraud
consumers and break the will of those business people who
work hard to pursue their ambitions....
The letter goes on to say:
The [current] Competition Act imposes sanctions and fines
on businesses, not on the managers who decide to operate a
cartel. It is right that mangers should also face sanctions,
because they can gain significantly if the companies they
work for make excess profits - it feeds through into
executive bonuses and share options. Those operating a
cartel are engaging in theft and should face a similar
sanction....
The letter then goes on to take issue with the various
arguments that have been advanced against the proposed legislation,
which I will not recount here, and concludes by stating:
I want to see a business environment that is fair for all
businesses. I will not defend the indefensible and will be
supporting the government and its bill.
Who is the author of this letter? You might expect by its tone
that it was written by a government official at the United Kingdom's
Office of Fair Trading or the Department of Trade and Industry. No.
The letter was written by David Lennan, who serves as the Director
General of the British Chamber of Commerce.
VI. Global Criminalization Of Cartel Activity - The
Next Milestone?
What is in store for the future of international anti-cartel
enforcement? Could the United Kingdom's proposed legislation to
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criminalize cartel offenses for individuals be the next major
milestone? A number of countries already have laws in place that
provide for criminal sanctions, including Canada, Japan, Ireland,
France, Norway, Austria, Germany, Korea, and the Slovak Republic.
Other countries, such as Australia, are already considering similar
laws. Is the day coming when hardcore cartels are prosecuted
criminally around the world? Sound farfetched? Could any of us have
predicted the changes that occurred in the last ten years or even in the
last few years? A few years ago, when the United Kingdom did not
even fine companies for cartel activity, would you have guessed that
today they would be moving towards jail terms for culpable
individuals? Back in the early 1990's, when antitrust fines topped out
at $2 million in the United States, did you advise clients that the time
was coming when they would risk fines of $100 million or more if
they engaged in cartel activity? Who among us expected to see the
day when European business executives would begin voluntarily
submitting themselves to U.S. jurisdiction and serving time in U.S.
prisons because they feared looking over their shoulders the rest of
their lives as international fugitives? The times they are a-changin'.
In November 2001, antitrust enforcers from more than
twenty-five countries around the world attended a workshop in
Canada to exchange best practices for fighting cartels. The Division
organized the first event of this kind in 1999 in Washington. In 2000,
it was hosted by the United Kingdom. Each year the debate shifts.
The interest in stronger and more aggressive anti-cartel enforcement
measures grows, while the safe havens for cartel activity shrink. So
stay tuned, because the one sure thing that you can predict is that
more changes are in store for the future.
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